ABSTRACT
Introduction
Recent studies have shown a negative impact of inequality on growth.
1 As far as we know, a negative relationship between inequality and efficiency has not been established. 2 This paper aims to establish such a link.
In neoclassical theory, the competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. On the other hand, " [c] onsumption externalities potentially break the link between Pareto optimality and competitive equilibria and open the door for beneficial government intervention" (Dupor and Liu, 2003) . The idea that individual well-being depends on the consumption of others has been used in the literature in analyses of government policy (e.g., Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000; Dupor and Liu, 2003) and of stock market behavior (e.g., Abel, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) . That idea is used here to show that welfare declines as inequality rises, that equilibrium inequality is inefficient, and that some redistribution is optimal. 3 1 Define "concern" ("jealousy") as an increase (decrease) in individual utility when other people's consumption rises. In other words, an increase in other people's consumption generates a positive (negative) externality in the case of concern (jealousy).
It is argued here that as general consumption grows, preferences gradually evolve from being dominated by concern to being dominated by jealousy. Dupor and Liu (2003) examine the implications of jealousy and of "keeping up with the Joneses." This paper expands on the former in two ways. First, the analysis in Dupor and Liu assumes symmetry, with all individuals being identical. We extend the analysis to the case of inequality. Second, consumption externalities depend on the level of per capita consumption in their analysis. We also examine the case where consumption externalities depend on the difference between individual and per capita consumption.
4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of consumption externalities under asymmetry, with consumption externalities depending on the difference in consumption. Section 3 concludes.
Model
Whether individuals experience concern or jealousy with respect to other people's consumption is likely to depend on the specifics of the situation. For instance, there is reason to believe that individual preferences exhibit concern for the consumption of others when that consumption is very low, that the extent of concern diminishes as the 2002). This is not the case in this paper where, even though they may be affected by other people's consumption, individuals are exclusively concerned with maximizing their own utility.
consumption of others increases, and that concern eventually turns to jealousy as the consumption of others continues to increase. For instance, a reduction in homelessness or hunger is likely to make most people feel better. At the other extreme, individuals are likely to envy people who own a private jet or are buying their third Summer home.
Let society be divided into two groups X and Y . The size of the population is fixed and normalized to unity, and the size of each group is 2 1 . Welfare is 2 / ) (
Per capita consumption is x and y , respectively. Individual
. 5 We abstract from externalities associated with per capita leisure, based on evidence that consumption externalities are more likely and more important (Solnick and Hemenway, 1998; Dupor and Liu, 2003) . Assuming conditions for an interior solution are satisfied, the first-order condition is
The social optimum is given by
Let i t be a proportional tax or subsidy rate. The private optimum is given by
US, a 10 percentage point increase in inequality reduces the number of people who report themselves as "Very Happy" by 18.5% and increases those who report themselves as "Not Too Happy" by 26%, with the corresponding figures for the EU being similar, namely, 21% and 27%, respectively. These findings are consistent with the implications of the model.
Conclusion
The paper examined the implications of the interdependence of preferences. It expands on aspects of Dupor and Liu (2003) by examining optimal interventions under inequality and by considering two alternative types of interdependencies. In the first case, which is available from the author, a low (high) level of consumption generates concern (jealousy) in other consumers. In the second case, a low (high) level of consumption relative to that of others generates concern (jealousy) in the latter. We show that welfare declines as inequality rises, that equilibrium inequality is inefficient, and that the optimal intervention lowers inequality.
